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a b s t r a c t
Modern systems, civilian (e.g. automotive), and military (manned and unmanned aircraft, surface
vehicles, submerged vessels), suffer initial design faults or failure modes (FMs), including software bugs,
which detrimentally affect the system's reliability and availability. FMs must be removed or mitigated in
impact during initial testing, including accelerated testing, in order for the system to meet its reliability
requirements and operate satisfactorily in the field. This paper concerns models for reliability growth in
which the behaviors of FMs are assumed independent, but of different types. Test effort is guided by
prior information, expressed probabilistically, on the random number and tenacities of such FMs that are
of various origins in the designs. Estimation of the numbers of FMs that will ultimately activate while in
the field is considered here.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
Failure mode removal from any system, both hardware and
software, is a dynamic uncertain process; see [1–19] for various
discussions of problem approaches. In [5,6,8,9,16] an unknown
number of FMs are supposed present in the system initially, and
the subsequent random times until FM activations are indepen-
dent and identically distributed; in [8,9] the unknown number of
failure modes is assumed deterministic and asymptotic arguments
are used for its estimation; in [5,6] the unknown number of FMs
has a Poisson distribution, and estimation of the Poisson mean is
discussed; [13] includes a Bayesian treatment of the general
model; [16] considers a dynamic statistical model for mean
number of FMs remaining. The models in [3,4] are widely used
and FM activations occur according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson
process; a Bayesian treatment of this model appears in Refs.
[14,15]. Additional nonhomogenous Poisson process models have
been suggested, including that of [17]. In [12] time series are used
to summarize software failure data; parameter estimation uses a
genetic algorithm; estimation is illustrated with small data sets. In
[18,19] a neural network approach is discussed. In [7,9] reliability
growth models are suggested for the management of system
testing. In [10] a series system of subsystems with resulting FM
masking is considered. The goal of failure avoidance, or system
reliability growth remains a concern to military and civilian system
designers, testers and operators; see Toyota automobile accelera-
tor pedal occasional mishaps ([20] and also [21]).
This paper presents an approach to modeling and statistical
analysis based on familiar applied stochastic process theory. The
model notion is that of identifying failure mode creation and
removal with an “infinite server queue”, a generalized so-called
M/G/1 system; here M refers to a general Markovian/memoryless
“arrival process” of failure modes into a system; G represents the
general distribution function of the “residence time”, or “service
time” in queueing language, of any FM in the system: either until
discovered and rectified, or, if not discovered during test, activates
in use, thus interrupting field operation usage and possibly causing
fatality. The individual FM residence times are here assumed
independent and identically distributed; however see [22] for
plausible variation. Finally, “1” refers to the practically infinite,
or unlimited number of locations/sites in the system where FMs
can reside; cf. [23]; these are “servers” in queueing context as in
Ref. [24]. Note that here the items present are all eligible for
service/removal when recognized. Later work will recognize con-
gestive servers, and evaluate priority removal. The M-arrival
process can include initial numbers of FMs of different types
having independent Poisson distributions, with additional FMs
that are inadvertently inserted during development according to
nonhomogeneous Poisson processes (NHPPs). The assumptions
that the unobservable initial number of FMs in a system have
Poisson distributions and that the unobservable insertion of
additional FMs in a system occur according to NHPPs is convenient
and has been made before; see [24–26]. Since the presence of a FM
in a system is a “rare event” the assumptions are reasonable, prima
facie.
The M/G/1 queue can represent many features encountered in
reliability growth data, as has been pointed out by [24–26]. In [24]
the NHPP is exploited to describe single-type fault (FM) occurrence;
our current results represent realistic recurrence of non-removed
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FMs. In [25] the discovery of FMs is modeled as occurring according
to a NHPP and the times until removal of FMs as independently
distributed random variables. The present paper extends the NHPP
model of [26] to include fault (FM) type differences plus the realistic
probability that actuated FMs are not removed until a removal
success. A FM's residence time can include multiple occurrences of
a FM due to unsuccessful attempts to remove the FM and may be
summarized by a renewal process or even an epidemic process; see
[27]. Our present work covers the likely random variation between
activation-recurrence rates of different FMs; see (4)–(7) in this paper.
These are seen to be natural and realistic extensions of [24–26]. The
actual number of FMs is unknown and random, and is realistically
controlled by the balance of the arrival and the service or fault-
removal process, and so may actually be small, but can grow
indefinitely, as in [28]. Note that the mathematical model can be
time – or system age – dependent, so different, even new, FM types
can be represented during a system design's lifetime.
The model proposed here, and the statistical methods based on
it, does not explicitly represent the phenomenon of mode masking,
meaning that early FM discovery, e.g. of a defect in a vehicle
ignition system, or missile launch stage, does not here effect
appearance of later FMs that may occur had the early FM not
occurred, e.g. in vehicle steering, or missile guidance and detona-
tion. We may view the present model as of one stage, s, of an
S-stage series or sequentially operating system. The present model
omits desirable mention of Prognostic Health Management (PHM),
meaning anticipatory replacement of failure-imminent compo-
nents or subsystems.
FMs remaining after testing detrimentally affect system field
reliability and availability. The purpose of the model and its
generalizations is to infer the properties of FMs remaining follow-
ing system testing. The formal model is presented and discussed in
Section 2 with examples of behavior that can be represented with
the multi-type M/G/1 queue. Of particular interest are statistical
models that represent the inherent variation between FMs.
A discussion of statistical inference is in Section 3. Section 4
illustrates issues of statistical inference using sample software
testing data. The statistical analysis suggests that several different
models summarize the data well and that more and extended
software testing would be prudent; models with more parameters
appear unneeded to summarize these data. The paper ends with
conclusions in Section 5.
2. Model for failure mode increase and decrease
Let
" λkðtÞ ¼ Random arrival rate of failure modes (FMs) of type k
into the system at time t, where λkðtÞis the rate of a time-dependent
Poisson process. These lie dormant until “flare up” or activation. In
other, and subsequent work we can allow FMs to issue warnings or
diagnostic symptoms that, if detected, can forestall serious failure.
Such FMs can result from human intervention to repair others.
FkðτÞ ¼ P Tk ≤τ
! "¼ Probability distribution of Tk, the random time
until the activation of a single type k FM.
Initially it is assumed that such times can repeat themselves, to
represent activations that occurred repeatedly but have not been
successfully removed; the times between activations being inde-
pendent and identically distributed. A special case of inter-
activation time distribution is the exponential distribution,
expðμkÞ,
Fkðτ;μkÞ ¼ 1&expf&μkτg ð1Þ
Note that the inter-activation time distribution function
FkðτÞ, and the arrival rate, λkðtÞ, can both be affected by environ-
mental influences, including human maintenance or operator, by
incorporation of suitable parameter sets and variables. Such
important effects are not treated here; they are left for later work.
Next,
" ρk ¼ Probability that a FM of type k is removed on any
activation. This parameter is initially assumed constant no
matter how many responses to activations have occurred; it
is a candidate for modification to represent learning.
" AkðτÞ ¼ Event that a failure mode of type k, is active, i.e. a latent










where Fnn is the n-fold convolution of the distribution F with itself.
This simply says that a fault that arrives in the system at t ¼ 0 has
(independently) activated any number, n, times but has not been









ð1&ρkÞn ¼ e&μkρkτ ð3Þ
Following [7], assume μk is a realization of independent
identically distributed random variables with distribution function
HkðμkÞ ¼ P μk ≤μk
! "
; that is, while each FM has independent expo-
nential times between activations, different FMs have different
mean inter-activation times drawn from a mixing distribution,
HkðdÞ. From (3), this then implies that
E e&μkρkτ
' (¼ Z 1
0
e&μkρkτdHk μk
# $¼ ~Hk ρkτ# $; ð4Þ
where ~HkðsÞ is the Laplace-Stieltjes transform of the distribution
function HkðμkÞ evaluated at s¼ ρkτ.
We propose two different forms for the mixing distribution, Hk
(A) Classical gamma.
(B) Positive stable law ([27]).
First, a simple explicit result for the transform of the gamma






Next, the positive stable law has relevant transform, for shape
parameter 0oαko1,





notationally (only) matching the stable scale and shape para-
meters to those of the gamma for 0oαko1.
It is evident that (5) and (6) represent the distribution of
residence time in the system of corresponding type k fault. Let Hk
here represent either Gk or Sk: the probability the residence time is
less than or equal to τ is
PðAkðτÞcÞ ¼ 1& ~HkðρkτÞ ð7Þ
Put
" NkðtÞ¼Random number of FMs, that activate and are removed
from the system during exposure time t, i.e. within ð0; t'. Note
that this includes those initially within the system plus those
that are introduced thereafter.
" RkðtÞ¼Random number of native FMs that either have not yet
activated or have activated but are not (yet) removed during
exposure time t.
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We assume that the FM removal times are independent. The
theory of M/G/1 service systems can now be invoked to show that
NkðtÞ and RkðtÞ are statistically independent and each have
independent components.
3. Preliminary results
NkðtÞ is the sum of those k& FMs that are initially in the design
and removed before exposure time t, and those that migrate in
thereafter, and are removed before t. Given Rkð0Þ, the natives that
are removed by t, Nkðt; oÞ, has a Binomial distribution with Rkð0Þ
trials and probability of removal ½1& ~HkðρktÞ'. The number of
immigrant modes, Nkðt; iÞ, that arrive and are removed during






λk xð Þdx ð8Þ
If Rkð0Þ is Poisson distributed with mean Mk, viewed either as a
Bayes prior, or else as a mixing distribution, then the number
removed has mean Mk½1& ~HkðρktÞ'þH#k ðtÞ.
The number of FMs remaining in the system at t
" RkðtÞ, the sum of those that remain in the system which
includes the survivors of those initially there, Rkðt; oÞ, plus those
immigrating and surviving until t, Rkðt; iÞ. If Nkð0Þ is taken as
Poisson ðMkÞ then the sum of Rkðt; oÞþRkðt; iÞ is Poisson, and












Justification is by Poisson thinning; see [30].
4. Statistical inference
The purpose of the modeling described and its many imagin-
able generalizations is to infer properties of FMs remaining
following Test (and Evaluation—in fact, this term refers to statis-
tical/operational analysis). The practical issue is control of “field”
FM incidence as it impacts system life-cycle cost and capability,
including availability, cf. [11]. The jargon used here is military in
origin, but has civilian meaning also; see [20].
Statistics are based upon data, which must come from realis-
tically designed and executed Tests, both at basic engineering
levels (contractor testing including accelerated testing and devel-
opmental testing, or DT), but importantly under field or opera-
tional environments (operational testing, or OT). Early test results
should be used to predict the occurrence of FMs in future testing.
" Test observables
Envision the various observable test outcomes from a subsys-
tem, or system test. We will encompass several of these in a formal
process of statistical inference.
Test data on continuously-failure-prone subsystems often give
test times of the ith occurrence of a FM of type k : 0rt1ko
t2ko⋯otiko⋯; the times between occurrences will here be
taken to be instances of iid absolutely continuous random
variables.
At such an event we assume that repair or rectification occurs
that is successful in removing the Type k FM with probability ρk,
and leaves the FM “as bad as old” with probability ρk ¼ 1&ρk.
4.1. Example of estimation of the mixing distribution: Each FM
activates at most once and all FMs are present initially
Consider original FMs only, with exponentially distributed type
k conditional activation times, and known removal probability
ρk ¼ 1. Then for rkð0Þ FMs at time 0, the ith, i¼ 1;2::; rkð0Þ,
observation time of activation of the ith type k FM, tiðkÞ, suggests
writing the conditional likelihood
LiðμkðiÞÞ ¼ e&μkðiÞtkðiÞμkðiÞ ð11Þ
And the (conditional-on-i) estimate is clearly μ^kðiÞ ¼ t&1k ðiÞ. The
latter will be treated as a random sample from a mixing distribu-
tion with finite mean and variance; (they can also be usefully
studied by exploratory data-analytical methods). Either method of
moments, maximum likelihood, invocation of Jeffries non-
informative priors, or previous system adjusted priors may be
used to fit the mixing distribution.
4.2. Example of likelihood: Exponentially distributed inter-event
(FM realization) times; all FMs are present initially
If nk activation times of a single type k FM are observed, then it
is clear that there have been at least nk&1 unsuccessful removal
attempts by the end of test time, t. We can express the likelihood
of the rate μk as, (using NR for not removed and R for removed)
Lðμk; tdk;nk;NRÞ
¼ ð1&ρkÞnk ðμkÞnkexpf&μktg ð12aÞ
Lðμk; tdk;nk;RÞ
¼ ð1&ρkÞnk &1ρk ðμkÞnkexpf&μktg ð12bÞ
Next introduce mixing distribution Hkðμk;θÞ; this mixing/para-
meter randomization occurs initially before the present phase of
testing, and represents inherent variation of activation among
Type k FMs. Thus post-test likelihoods should remove the condi-








where a conjugate “mixer”, Hkðd;θkÞ, here is gamma ðβk;αkÞ, or
positive stable.
Likewise one can mix on ρk; this step is omitted.
Note that the above represents a single (one) multi-time
observation of activations of a single FM, of which there can have
been several. Of course further uncertainty exists with respect to
the removal probability, ρk, which can be estimated by Bayesian
methods (depending on a satisfactory prior's availability). A
deeper uncertainty is whether the final observation is actually
the last, i.e. whether the FM has been removed or not. It will be
convenient, but optimistic, to assume that a successful removal is
known to be successful at the time. Otherwise, a non-activation
run/sequence of tests can provide empirical evidence. In what
follows we assume the outcome of an attempted removal of a FM
cause is known.
4.3. Sequential fault removal
Adopt this specific model: decision-makers view a system
S through a period of developmental or preliminary engineering
test of operating time duration D, followed by a period of duration
T , where the latter is the duration of more demanding operational
test. We assume all FMs are present initially; the times between
activations of a single FM are independent identically distributed
having distribution (7). Focus on inferring status of an FM type k at
the end of testing occurring at time DþT using information from
test results during D.
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Refer now to (4)–(6), and treat GkðdÞ and SkðdÞ as alternative
mixing distributions. Suppose πkðz;θÞ represents a mixing/prior
density function, either GkðdÞ or SkðdÞ. Note that during D, the rate
of failure is influenced by controllable test and uncontrolled
environmental conditions represented by vector explanatory vari-
able x, to make μDk ¼ μkθkðxÞ; likewise for survivors of D into T ,
μTk ¼ μkθkðyÞ, where vector y represents conditions during T . The
controllable explanatory conditions, “factors” and levels, are
essential to specify the tests; actual factor level values achieved
during the tests should be measured. The controllable factors'
levels chosen should be guided by modeling and simulation and
prior tests to have a good predictive chance of success, but
adjusted to challenge the system further after initial success is
demonstrated.
A single FM of type k may experience these outcomes:
(a) Not removed (survives) T , given activates (at least once during D)
and survives D;
(b) Removed during T , given activates and survives D;
(c) Survives T , given does not activate during D;
(d) Removed during T , given does not activate during D;
(e) Activates and removed during D.
Apply Bayes' formula to remove the condition on μk, given




























PðdÞ ¼ 1&PðcÞ ð19Þ
The expressions (14)–(19) can be evaluated for both Gk and/or Sk.
Again, every event labeled Survive means that such is regarded as
potentially active in the following testing stage, and those labeled
removed may have failed, perhaps several times, but have been
removed before the end of the current testing stage. If the outcome
(a) is observed, this can be taken to mean that the FM in question
survives to experience in-the-Field activation.
To estimate the mean number of FMs that have not yet
activated, assume that the number of FMs of type k observed
during D is the thinned result of a Poisson random variable having
mean Mk. If the number of type k FMs observed to have activated
at least once during D is mkðDÞ, setting mkðDÞ equal to the expected
number of FMs activated gives (method of moments)
mkðDÞ ¼Mk½1&πnkðθkðxÞ;DÞ' ð20Þ
so




The estimated (mean) number of k&FMs that have not acti-
vated during D
M^kðDÞ&mkðDÞ ¼ bR0k ð0Þ ¼mkðDÞπnkðθkðxÞÞ1&πnkðθkðxÞ;DÞ ð22Þ
Of course it will be of greater interest to focus on separately
estimating, or dealing with FMs in category (a) than for those not
yet observed.
5. Estimation: One type of FM; all FMs present initially; each
FM activates at most once
In this section we consider a model with one type of FM. The
number of FMs at time 0 is modeled as Poisson distributed with
mean M. No additional FMs are introduced. Each FM activates at
most once. The activation times are independent identically
distributed with distribution function F having survivor function
F ¼ 1&F , and density function f . Let U i be the random time of
activation of the ith FM; NðtÞ be the number of FMs that activate
during ð0; t'; and D be the total developmental test time. Standard
calculations yield





















Setting the partial derivative equal to 0 results in
M^¼ n
FðDÞ ð26Þ
Evaluating ℓ at bM results in




Estimate the parameters of F using the conditional distribution
of U given UrD.
To illustrate, consider the empirical data displayed in Table 1 of
[31]; cf. [6]. The data are the times between failures (in days) of a
piece of software (FM types not distinguished). There are 34
failures. Each FM (software bug) occurs at most once. The software
was released after the 31st failure which occurred on day 540. The
last 3 failures occurred after the software was fielded. The last
observation is a FM activation on day 849. We estimate model
parameters using FM activation times that occur at or before day
600. Then use these estimates to estimate the expected number of
FMs that activate in the remaining time until day 849.
Three distributions F are considered: the often invoked expo-
nential; the gamma-mixed exponential distribution, (5); and the
inverse Weibull distribution, FIW ðtÞ ¼ expf&½1=βt'αg. The exponen-
tial with parameter mixed by a stable law, (6), could not be used to
summarize the data: the data do not support an estimated stable
shape parameter less than 1.
Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the parameters of the
distribution F using the 31 FM activation times less than or equal




The estimated expected number of FMs that activate between
day 600 and the last recorded FM activation time of 849 days,
E^ Nð849Þ−Nð600Þ½ ' ¼ M^ F^ð849Þ−F^ð600Þ
h i
ð29Þ
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Another model often used to summarize data of this kind is the
power law non-homogeneous Poisson process; that is, NðtÞ; t≥0! "
is a non-homogenous Poisson process (NHPP) with mean value
function E NðtÞ½ ' ¼ γtδ; cf. [32] which also discusses maximum
likelihood estimation of γ and δ. The power law model is often
referred to as the Duane-Crow-AMSAA model in the context of
reliability growth; cf. [3,4,28]. The conditional distribution of
the unordered activation times during the first 600 days given
activation during the first 600 days is that of 31 independent
and identically distributed random variables having distribution,
(cf. [33]),
FNHPPðtÞ ¼ E NðtÞ½ '=E Nð600Þ½ ' ð30Þ
For the models that are not the power law NHPP, Table 1
displays the distributions' parameter estimates; the estimated
expected mean number of FMs remaining after day 600; and the
estimated probability a FM activates on or before Day 600. Also
displayed are the estimated expected number of FMs that activate
between day 600 and the last recorded FM activation time of 849
days, computed using (29). Table 1 also displays the estimated
parameters for the power law NHPP and the resulting estimated
expected number of FMs that activate between day 600 and day
849,
E^NHPP Nð849Þ−Nð600Þ½ ' ¼ γ^ 849δ^−600δ^
h i
ð31Þ
Bootstrap is used to assess the variability of the estimates;
cf. [34]. A bootstrap replication consists of
1) The number of FMs that are observed during the first 600 days
which is simulated from a Poisson distribution with mean
equal to the number of observed FMs; in the example, the
mean is 31.
2) A collection of activation times sampled with replacement from
the observed activation times. The number in the collection is
the number of observations, 31.
For the models that are not the power law NHPP, the para-
meters of the activation time distribution are estimated using the
bootstrap sample of the activation times and the total test time of
600 days; the mean number of FMs at time 0 is estimated using
(28). The bootstrap results for the power law NHPP use the
bootstrap samples of 31 activation times.
100 bootstrap replications were conducted. An estimated 95%
confidence interval is computed, with lower bound the 0.025
percentile and upper bound the 0.975 percentile of the bootstrap
sample. The expected number of FMs that activate between day
600 and day 849 is computed using (29) and (31). The same
bootstrap replications are used to estimate parameters for all the
models. The results appear in Table 1.
Let ui be the ith observed FM activation time. Fig. 1 displays
lnð& lnð1&½F^ðuiÞ=F^ð600Þ'ÞÞ versus ui for each of the three models
with an activation time distribution; ui versus lnð& ln
ð1& F^NHPPðuiÞÞÞ is displayed; also displayed is ui versus the non-
parametric estimate ln ½& lnð1&½ði&0:5Þ=31'Þ'.
Fig. 1 suggests that the inverse Weibull distribution sum-
marizes the 1st 31 activation times somewhat better than the
other models; however the convenient simple exponential also
summarizes well. Note that these data are used to estimate the
distributions' parameters. From Table 1, the power law NHPP
predicts a larger expected number of FMs occurring in the time
period (600, 849] than the other 3 models. Among the other three
Table 1




activates at or before 600
days [95% CI]
Estimated expected
number of FMs remaining
at time 600 [95% CI]
Estimated probability
0 FMs remain after day
600 [95% CI]
Estimated expected number of
FMs that activate in the time
interval (600, 849] [95% CI]











mixed with a gamma
distribution
FðtÞ ¼ 1& 1þξt=α' (&α
bα ¼ 11:3;

























NA NA NA 6.7
[5.4, 8.1]
Fig. 1. Transformed estimated survivor function of FM activation time.
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models, the inverse Weibull distribution results in an estimated
mean number of FMs remaining at day 600 about 6 times larger
than those of the other models with activation time distributions.
The Inverse Weibull distribution also estimates a mean number of
FMs activating between day 600 and 849 over twice as large as the
other two models with activation time distributions; the observed
number of FMs activating during this time period is 3. However,
there is no statistical difference between estimates of the expected
number of FMs activating between day 600 and 849 for the three
models with activation time distributions.
Since the inverse Weibull model appears to be the best
summary of the data, we present its parameter estimates using
all the data: The parameter point estimates for the inverse Weibull
model using all the failure data are bα ¼ 0:7; bβ ¼ 0:009. The
resulting estimated mean number of FMs remaining after the last
recorded FM activation is 9.3. The estimated median of the
distribution of the number of additional days until the next FM
activation is 113 days; the 90th percentile is 487 days. Thus, even
after 3 additional failures, it may be premature to release the
software.
6. Conclusions
In this paper models are presented to assess system reliability
growth. System reliability growth is achieved by testing the
system to find failure modes (FMs) and mitigating their effects.
Removing or mitigating the effect of FMs increases the system's
field reliability and availability. The model notion is that of
identifying failure mode creation and removal with an “infinite
server queue”, a generalized so-called M/G/1 system. The models
represent the number of FMs; the time until a FM is activated/
detected, and the subsequent experience of the FM until its
removal. The number of FMs is assumed to have a Poisson
distribution and the times to detect and subsequent experiences
of the FMs are modeled as independent of each other and of the
number of FMs. Models that represent the inherent variation
between FMs are considered. The estimation of model parameters
and assessment of model summarization of data are discussed and
illustrated. The models proposed here appear to summarize the
illustrative data better than the “traditional” non-homogeneous
power law model.
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